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Blind quantum computation is a new secure quantum computing protocol which enables Alice
who does not have sufficient quantum technology to delegate her quantum computation to Bob
who has a fully-fledged quantum computer in such a way that Bob cannot learn anything about
Alice’s input, output, and algorithm. In previous protocols, Alice needs to have a device which
generates quantum states, such as single-photon states. Here we propose another type of blind
computing protocol where Alice does only measurements, such as the polarization measurements
with a threshold detector. In several experimental setups, such as optical systems, the measurement
of a state is much easier than the generation of a single-qubit state. Therefore our protocols ease
Alice’s burden. Furthermore, the security of our protocol is based on the no-signaling principle,
which is more fundamental than quantum physics. Finally, our protocols are device independent
in the sense that Alice does not need to trust her measurement device in order to guarantee the
security.
A first-generation quantum computer will be imple-
mented in the “cloud” style, since only limited number
of groups, such as governments and huge industries, will
be able to possess it. How can a client of such a cloud
quantum computing assure the security of his/her pri-
vacy? Protocols of blind quantum computation [1–11]
provide a solution. Blind quantum computation is a
new secure quantum computing protocol which enables a
client (Alice) who has only a classical computer or a prim-
itive quantum device which is not sufficient for universal
quantum computation to delegate her computation to a
server (Bob) who has a fully-fledged quantum computer
without leaking any Alice’s privacy (i.e., which algorithm
Alice wants to run, which value Alice inputs, and what
is the output of the computation) to Bob [1–11].
The first example of blind quantum computation was
proposed by Childs [1] where the quantum circuit model
was used, and the register state was encrypted with quan-
tum one-time pad [12] so that Bob who performs quan-
tum gates learns nothing about information in the quan-
tum register. In this method, however, Alice needs to
have a quantum memory and the ability to perform the
SWAP gate. The protocol proposed by Arrighi and Sal-
vail [2] is that for the calculation of certain classical func-
tions, i.e., not the universal quantum computation, and it
requires Alice to prepare and measure multi-qubit entan-
gled states. Furthermore, it is cheat-sensitive, i.e., Bob
can gain information if he does not mind being caught.
Finally, in their protocol, Bob knows the unitary which
Alice wants to implement. Aharonov, Ben-Or and Eban’s
protocol [4] requires a constant-sized quantum computer
with a quantum memory for Alice.
On the other hand, in 2009, Broadbent, Fitzsimons
and Kashefi [3] proposed a new blind quantum computa-
tion protocol which uses the one-way model [13–16]. In
their protocol, all Alice needs are a classical computer
and a primitive quantum device, which emits randomly
rotated single-qubit states. In particular, Alice does not
require any quantum memory and the protocol is uncon-
ditionally secure (i.e., Alice’s input, output, and algo-
rithm are secret to Bob whatever Bob does). Recently,
this protocol has been experimentally demonstrated in an
optical system [7]. Furthermore, this innovative protocol
has inspired several new other protocols which can enjoy
more robust blind quantum computation. In Ref. [5], two
protocols which enable blind measurement-based quan-
tum computation on the Affleck-Kennedy-Lieb-Tasaki
(AKLT) state [17, 18] have been proposed. In Ref. [8],
a protocol of the blind topological measurement-based
quantum computation [19–21] has been proposed. Due
to the topological protection, it is fault-tolerant [19–
21]. The error threshold of the blind topological model
has been shown to be comparable to that of the origi-
nal [19, 20] (i.e., non-blind) topological quantum compu-
tation [8].
Before starting the main part of this paper, let us
quickly review the protocol of Ref. [3]. In this proto-
col, Alice and Bob share a classical channel and a quan-
tum channel. The protocol runs as follows: (1) Alice
prepares randomly-rotated single-qubit states {|θj〉 ≡
|0〉+ eiθj |1〉}Nj=1, where θj ∈ A ≡ {kpi4 |k = 0, 1, ..., 7} is a
random angle, and sends them to Bob through the quan-
tum channel. (2) Bob creates a certain two-dimensional
graph state, which is called the brickwork state [3], by
applying the CZ gates among {|θj〉}Nj=1. (3) Alice calcu-
lates the measurement angle on her classical computer,
2and sends it to Bob through the classical channel. (4)
Bob performs the measurement in that angle, and re-
turns the measurement result to Alice. (5) They repeat
(3)-(4) until the computation is finished.
If Bob is honest, Alice obtains the correct answer of
her desired quantum computation [3]. Furthermore, it
was shown that whatever evil Bob does, Bob cannot learn
anything about Alice’s input, output, and algorithm [3].
The motivation of the blind quantum computation is
to enable Alice, who does not have any sophisticated
technology and enough knowledge, to perform universal
quantum computation. Therefore, there are two impor-
tant goals. One is to make Alice’s device as classical as
possible, since Alice is not expected to have any expen-
sive laboratory which can maintain the coherence of com-
plicated quantum experimental setups. The other is to
exempt Alice from the precise verification of her device,
since Alice is not expected to have enough technology and
knowledge to verify her device. Such a verification is im-
portant since she might buy the device from a company
which is under the control of Bob, and therefore the de-
vice might not work as Alice expects. For example, if Al-
ice is supposed to send a single-photon to Bob, Alice must
confirm that more than two identical photons are not sent
to Bob, since otherwise Bob might be able to gain some
information by using, e.g., the photon-number-splitting
(PNS) attack [22–25], which is a well-known technique
in quantum key distribution (QKD). In Ref. [6], a first
step to the first goal, namely making Alice’s device more
classical, was achieved. They proposed an ingenious pro-
tocol of the blind quantum computation in which what
Alice needs to prepare are not single-photon states but
coherent states. Since coherent states are considered to
be more classical than single-photon states, their proto-
col allows Alice’s device to be more classical.
In this paper, we show that Alice who has only a mea-
surement device can perform the blind quantum compu-
tation. In several experimental setups, such as quantum
optical systems, the measurement of a state, e.g., the
polarization measurement of photons with a threshold
detector, is much easier than the generation of a single-
qubit state, such as a single-photon state. Therefore, our
results achieve the above mentioned first goal, namely
making Alice’s device more classical. As we will see later,
our protocols can cope with the particle loss in the quan-
tum channel between Alice and Bob and the measure-
ment inefficiencies of Alice’s measurement device. It also
means that our protocols allow Alice’s device to be more
classical.
We propose two new protocols, Protocol 1 and Proto-
col 2. Importantly, the security of Protocol 1 is based
on the no-signaling principle [27], which is more funda-
mental than quantum physics [27]. Therefore, even if
Bob does a super-quantum (but no-signaling) attack, Al-
ice’s privacy is still guaranteed. Furthermore, the device-
independence [26] is attained for the security of Protocol
1. Hence the above second goal is also achieved. The
security based on the no-signaling principle and device-
independence are important subjects in quantum key dis-
tribution, and much researches have been done within the
decade [28]. However, Protocol 1 cannot cope with a high
channel loss. Protocol 2 can tolerate any high channel
loss, but the device-independence becomes weaker.
Protocol 1.— Our first protocol runs as follows: (1)
Bob prepares a resource state of measurement-based
quantum computation. Any resource state can be used
for this purpose. For example, the two-dimensional clus-
ter state [13–15], the three-dimensional cluster state for
the topological quantum computation [19–21], the ther-
mal equilibrium states of a nearest-neighbour two-body
Hamiltonian with spin-2 and spin-3/2 particles [29] or
solely with spin-3/2 particles [30] at a finite temper-
ature for the topological measurement-based quantum
computation, resource states for the quantum compu-
tational tensor network [31–37], the one-dimensional or
two-dimensional AKLT states [18, 38, 39], the tri-cluster
state [40], and states in the Haldane phase [41]. (2) Bob
sends a particle of the resource state to Alice through
the quantum channel. (3) Alice measures the particle in
a certain angle which is determined by the algorithm in
her mind. They repeat (2)-(3) until the computation is
finished.
Obviously, at the end of the computation, Alice ob-
tains the correct answer of her desired quantum compu-
tation if Bob is honest, since what Alice and Bob did is
nothing but a usual measurement-based quantum com-
putation. (It is something like the following story: Alice
and Bob are in the same laboratory. The preparation and
the maintenance of the resource state, which are boring
routines, are done by a student Bob, whereas the most
exciting part of the measurement-based quantum com-
putation, namely the measurements and the collection of
data are done by his boss Alice. Somehow, there is no
communication between the boss and the student.)
It is also easy to understand that whichever states
evil Bob prepares instead of the correct resource state,
and whichever states evil Bob sends to Alice, Bob can-
not learn anything about Alice’s information, since Alice
does not send any signal to Bob and therefore because
of the no-signaling principle [27] Bob cannot gain any in-
formation about Alice by measuring his system [42]: If
Alice could transmit some information to Bob by mea-
suring her system, it contradicts to the no-signaling prin-
ciple [44]. (Note that we assume there is no unwanted
leakage of information from Alice’s laboratory. For ex-
ample, Bob cannot bug Alice’s laboratory. It is the stan-
dard assumption in the quantum key distribution [45].)
In Sec. I of Appendix, we give the mathematical proof
of the security of Protocol 1 based on the no-signaling
principle.
Protocol 1 has four advantages. First, unlike Ref. [3],
no random-number generator is required for Alice. This
3is advantageous since it is not easy to generate com-
pletely random numbers, and the random-number gener-
ator might be provided by a company under the control of
Bob. Second, the security of the protocol is device inde-
pendent in the sense that Alice does not need to trust her
measurement device in order to guarantee the security,
since whatever Alice’s device does, Bob cannot gain any
information about Alice’s computation (due to the no-
signaling principle) as long as there is no unwanted leak-
age of information from Alice’s laboratory, which is the
standard assumption in quantum key distribution [45].
Third, the proof of the security is intuitive and very sim-
ple, and it is based on the no-signaling principle [27],
which is more fundamental than quantum physics [27].
(Even if quantum physics is violated in a future, Proto-
col 1 survives as long as the no-signaling principle holds.)
Finally, any model of measurement-based quantum com-
putation (such as the cluster model [13–15], the AKLT
models [18, 38, 39], and the topological model [19–21],
etc.) can be directly changed into a blind model: Bob has
only to let Alice do measurements. (On the other hand,
in Ref. [5], many complicated procedures are required to
make the AKLT measurement-based quantum computa-
tion blind.) Since no modification is required to make a
model blind, the advantage of a model is preserved when
it is changed into a blind model. For example, an advan-
tage of doing the measurement-based quantum computa-
tion on the AKLT states is that the quantum computa-
tion is protected by the energy gap of a physically natural
Hamiltonian [18, 38, 39]. If the AKLT model is used in
Protocol 1, Bob who prepares and maintains the resource
AKLT state can enjoy that advantage, i.e., Bob’s state
is protected by the energy gap. This is also the case for
the models of Refs. [29, 30]: If these models are used in
Protocol 1, Bob can enjoy the advantage of these models,
i.e., Bob does not need to keep his state in the ground
state; His state is allowed to be the equilibrium state at
a finite temperature.
A disadvantage of Protocol 1 is that the quantum
channel between Alice and Bob must not be too lossy.
(Throughout this paper, “the channel loss” includes the
detection inefficiency of Alice’s device, since the detec-
tion inefficiency behaves like the channel loss.) On the
other hand, in the previous protocols [3, 5, 7–9] where
Alice sends randomly rotated particles to Bob, the high
loss rate of the quantum channel is not crucial, since if
Bob does not receive a particle due to the loss in the
quantum channel, Bob has only to ask Alice to again
generate and send another state with another random
angle. One way of overcoming that disadvantage of Pro-
tocol 1 is to use a model which can cope with the par-
ticle loss. For example, it was shown in Ref. [46] that
the topological measurement-based quantum computa-
tion [19–21] can cope with the heralded particle loss if
the loss probability is below the threshold. If Bob uses
this model, Alice and Bob can perform Protocol 1 with-
out suffering from the particle loss as long as the loss rate
of the quantum channel between Alice and Bob (and that
of Alice’s device) is below the loss threshold calculated
in Ref. [46].
Protocol 2.— If we want to have a protocol which is
tolerant against any high channel loss rate, we have to
give up the perfect no-singling, since Alice has to send
some message to Bob when a particle is lost.
One way of making Protocol 1 tolerant against any
high channel loss is to use the quantum teleportation.
Let us consider the following protocol: (1) Bob prepares
a resource state. (2) He creates a Bell pair, and sends
a half of it to Alice. (3) If the particle is lost, Alice
asks Bob to send it again. If Alice receives the particle,
Alice lets Bob know it. (4) Bob teleports a particle of
his resource state to Alice by using the Bell pair. (5)
Bob sends the measurement result of the teleportation
to Alice. (6) Alice measures the teleported particle in an
angle which is determined by her algorithm (and Bob’s
teleportation result).
This protocol is a modified version of Protocol 1 where
Bob teleports a particle of his resource state instead of
directly sending it to Alice. This protocol is loss tolerant,
since if a half of a Bell pair is lost in the channel, Bob
has only to send it again. However, this protocol has a
huge problem: Alice has to have a single-particle quan-
tum memory, since Alice’s measurement must be done
after Bob’s teleportation (otherwise Alice cannot cor-
rect byproducts created by Bob’s teleportation). Such
a quantum memory does not need to have a long coher-
ence time since the quantum teleportation can be done
quickly, but still the requirement of a quantum memory
is disadvantageous to Alice.
Here, we introduce Protocol 2, which can avoid such a
quantum memory. This is our second main result of this
paper. The basic idea of Protocol 2 is that Alice “pre-
pares” rotated states which “encode” algorithm in Bob’s
place, and Bob performs a layer-by-layer measurement-
based quantum computation with these rotated states.
Protocol 2 runs as follows: (1) Bob creates a Bell pair,
and sends a half of it to Alice through the quantum chan-
nel. (2) If Alice does not receive it, because of the chan-
nel loss, Alice asks Bob to send it again and goes back
to (1). (3) If Alice receives the particle, she measures
it in the basis {|0〉 ± e−iθ|1〉}, where θ is a certain an-
gle (not a random angle) determined by the algorithm
which Alice wants to run. (θ = 0, pi/2 for Clifford gates,
and θ = pi/4 for a non-Clifford gate. Details will be ex-
plained in Sec. II of Appendix.) In this way, Alice can
“prepare” a state which encodes the angle of the algo-
rithm in Bob’s place. (4) Bob couples the half of the Bell
pair which he has to a qubit of his register state by using
the CZ gate, and measures the qubit in the register state
in the {|+〉, |−〉} basis. This X-basis measurement im-
plements the quantum gate. (5) Bob sends the result of
this X-basis measurement to Alice through the classical
4channel. (6) They repeat (1)-(5) until the computation
is finished.
In Sec. III of Appendix, we show the blindness of Pro-
tocol 2: whichever states evil Bob prepares and whichever
states evil Bob sends to Alice, Bob cannot learn anything
about Alice’s information.
One might think Alice’s measurement in step (3) has
to be delayed until the end of step (5) so that she can
feed-forward Bob’s measurement outcome as usual one-
way model. However, this is not the case. In Protocol
2, by properly choosing the measurement basis, we give
a way to postpone Alice’s feed-forwarding until her sub-
sequent measurements, and hence she does not have to
wait for Bob’s measurement outcome. This means that
no quantum memory is required for Alice. In Sec. II
of Appendix, we give a detailed explanations about how
Alice should measure particles.
In this way, we can obtain a protocol which is loss tol-
erant. However, as we have mentioned earlier, there is a
trade-off between loss tolerance and no-signaling. Proto-
col 2 is no longer no-signaling. In Protocol 1, no signal
is transmitted from Alice to Bob, and therefore the no-
signaling is completely satisfied. However, in Protocol 2,
the message whether Alice receives a particle or not is
sent from Alice to Bob, and therefore the no-signaling is
no longer satisfied. One might think that such a message
is not directly related to Alice’s measurement angles, and
therefore the situation is “quasi” no-signaling. However,
if we want to show the device-independence security, a
special care is necessary. In Ref. [47] it was shown that
in quantum key distribution if Alice and Bob use the
same measuring device many times, some secret infor-
mation can be broadcasted through the “legal” channel.
Similar attack can be considered in our Protocol 2. For
example, let us assume that Alice does the measurement
in the angle 5pi/4. Then, the measuring device remem-
bers the number 5, and pretends to loss the particle fifth
times. Then Alice sends the message, “the particle is
lost”, to Bob fifth times, and from that fact, Bob can
know the number 5. One way of avoiding such an attack
is, as is explained in Ref. [47], to discard the measur-
ing device after using it, and to use new device for every
measurement. The other way, which can be used in our
Protocol 2, is that Alice generates a random bit b when
Bob sends a particle, and behaves as if the particle is
lost (arrived) when b = 0 (1). In this case, Alice needs a
random number generator, but the evil measuring device
can no longer do that attack.
Discussion.— In this paper, we have proposed proto-
cols of blind quantum computation for Alice who does
only measurements, such as the polarization measure-
ment with a threshold detector. In quantum optics,
for example, the state measurement is much easier than
the single-qubit state generation. Therefore our scheme
makes Alice more classical than the previous proto-
cols [3, 5, 8] in certain experimental setups, such as op-
tical systems. In the protocol of Ref. [6], Bob is required
to perform the non-demolition photon-number measure-
ment, which is not easy with the current technology. In
our protocols, on the other hand, Bob is not required to
have such an additional high technology.
We have proposed two protocols, Protocol 1 and Pro-
tocol 2. Procotol 1 is simple, its security is based on
the no-signaling principle, and it satisfies the device-
independent security. However, it can not tolerate a high
channel loss rate. On the other hand, Protocol 2 can
tolerate any high channel loss rate, although it is more
complicated than Protocol 1 and no longer no-signaling.
Appropriate one should be chosen depending on the sit-
uation.
Finally, let us briefly discuss about the verification [3,
4, 9, 48] of blind quantum computing. The verification
is a way of Alice checking whether Bob is honestly fol-
lowing her protocol [3, 4, 9, 48]. It is important for blind
quantum computation, since evil Bob can just destroy
the computation and Alice might accept wrong compu-
tational results. Methods of the verification for blind
quantum computation of Ref. [3] were already proposed
in Refs. [3, 9]. Can we do the verification for our mea-
suring Alice blind quantum computation? One simple
way of doing verification is that Alice randomly chooses
some subsystem of the resource state and measures the
stabilizer operators in order to check whether Bob cor-
rectly creates the resource graph state. Recently, more
efficient way of doing verification for our measuring Al-
ice protocol has been proposed in Ref. [48], which uses
the previous verification methods of Aharonov, Ben-Or,
and Eban [4] and Fitzsimons and Kashefi [9]. By using
that verification method, Alice can check whether Bob is
honestly doing computation or not.
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BLINDNESS OF PROTOCOL 1
We assume that the initial state of the computation is the standard state |0...0〉, and the preparation of the input
state is included in the computational part. Therefore, we can assume without loss of generality that what Alice
wants to hide are the computation angles of the measurement-based quantum computation and the final output of
the computation. Intuitively, a protocol is blind if Bob, given all the classical and quantum information during the
protocol, cannot learn anything about Alice’s computational angles and the output [3, 5, 6, 8].
5Definition: In this paper, we call a protocol is blind if
(B1) The conditional probability distribution of Alice’s computational angles, given all the classical information Bob
can obtain during the protocol, and given the measurement results of any POVMs which Bob may perform on
his system at any stage of the protocol, is equal to the a priori probability distribution of Alice’s computational
angles, and
(B2) The conditional probability distribution of the final output of Alice’s algorithm, given all the classical information
Bob can obtain during the protocol, and given the measurement results of any POVMs which Bob may perform
on his system at any stage of the protocol, is equal to the a priori probability distribution of the final output of
Alice’s algorithm.
 Intuitively, this means that Bob’s “certainty” about Alice’s information does not changed even if Bob does POVM
on his system.
Theorem 1: Protocol 1 satisfies (B1).
Proof: Let A be the random variable which represents Alice’s measurement angles, and B be the random variable
which represents the type of the POVM which Bob performs on his system. Let MB be the random variable which
represents the result of Bob’s POVM. The two-party system is called no-signaling [27] from Alice to Bob iff
P (MB = mB|A = a,B = b) = P (MB = mB |A = a′, B = b),
for all mB, a, a
′, and b. Then,
P (A = a|B = b,MB = mB) = P (MB = mB|A = a,B = b)P (A = a,B = b)
P (B = b,MB = mB)
=
P (MB = mB|A = a,B = b)P (A = a|B = b)P (B = b)
P (B = b,MB = mB)
=
P (MB = mB|A = a′, B = b)P (A = a′|B = b)P (B = b)
P (B = b,MB = mB)
= P (A = a′|B = b,MB = mB).
This means that Bob cannot learn anything about Alice’s measurement angles. 
Theorem 2: Protocol 1 satisfies (B2).
Proof: Let O be the random variable which represents the output of Alice’s algorithm, and B be the random
variable which represents the type of the POVM which Bob performs on his system. Let MB be the random variable
which represents the result of Bob’s POVM. Alice can change the output of her algorithm by changing the input. (For
example, since what is implemented in the quantum computation is a unitary operation, two input states which are
orthogonal with each other become two mutually-orthogonal output states.) Because of the no-signaling principle,
P (MB = mB|O = o,B = b) = P (MB = mB|O = o′, B = b)
for all mB, o, o
′, and b. Then,
P (O = o|B = b,MB = mB) = P (MB = mB|O = o,B = b)P (O = o,B = b)
P (B = b,MB = mB)
=
P (MB = mB|O = o,B = b)P (O = o|B = b)P (B = b)
P (B = b,MB = mB)
=
P (MB = mB|O = o′, B = b)P (O = o′|B = b)P (B = b)
P (B = b,MB = mB)
= P (O = o′|B = b,MB = mB).
Therefore, Bob cannot learn anything about the output of Alice’s algorithm. 
CORRECTNESS OF PROTOCOL 2
Protocol 2 runs as follows: (1) Bob prepares the Bell pair and sends the half of it to Alice. (2) If Alice does not
receive it, she asks Bob to try again, and goes back to (1). (3) If Alice receives the particle, she does the measurement
6in the
{ 1√
2
(|0〉 ± e−iθ|1〉)}
basis. How to choose θ will be explained later. After her measurement, Bob has the state
ZaRθ|+〉,
where |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉), a ∈ {0, 1} is Alice’s measurement result, and
Rθ =
(
1 0
0 eiθ
)
.
Note that RθX = e
iθXR−θ. (4) Bob creates the state
CZ1,2
(
|ψ〉1 ⊗ ZaRθ|+〉2
)
,
where CZ1,2 is the CZ gate between the first and the second qubits and |ψ〉 is any Bob’s state. (5) Bob performs the
measurement in the basis {|+〉, |−〉} on the first qubit. Since ZaRθ commutes with CZ1,2, Bob obtains
ZaRθX
mH |ψ〉2 (1)
if the measurement result is m ∈ {0, 1}, where H is the Hadamard gate.
For θ = 0, Eq. (1) becomes
ZaXmH |ψ〉2.
For θ = pi/2, Eq. (1) becomes
ZaRpi/2X
mH |ψ〉2 = ZaXmR(−1)mpi/2H |ψ〉2
= ZaXmZmRpi/2H |ψ〉2
= Za+mXmSH |ψ〉2,
where S = Rpi/2.
For θ = −pi/4, Eq. (1) becomes
ZaR−pi/4X
mH |ψ〉2 = ZaXmR−(−1)mpi/4H |ψ〉2
=
{
ZaXmTH |ψ〉2 (m = 0)
ZaXmT †H |ψ〉2 (m = 1),
where T = R−pi/4.
Note that
(PH)(PH)(PH) = PH,
(PH)(PH)(PSH) = PSH,
(PH)(PSH)(PSH) = PHSHSH = PZS
(PH)(PH)(PTH) = PTH,
(PSH)(PH)(PTH) = PT †H,
(PSH)(PH)(PT †H) = PTH,
(PH)(PH)(PT †H) = PT †H,
where P is a Pauli byproduct. (Be careful that different Pauli byproducts are represented by the same character P
for simplicity.) This means that the operations
{
H,TH, T †H,SH, S
}
7can be done deterministically (up to Pauli byproducts) if Alice and Bob repeat the above (1)-(5) three times. Therefore,
if we consider the unit cell (Fig. 1), the operations
{
I ⊗ I, SH ⊗ I, STH ⊗ I, ST †H ⊗ I,H ⊗ I, (CZ)(CNOT )
}
can be implemented deterministically up to some Pauli byproducts as is shown in Fig. 2. Note that this set is universal
set, since
(PSH)(PH) = PS,
(PS)(PSTH)(P ′H) = PT,
(PS)(PST †H)(P ′′H) = PT,
where P ′ is I or X , and P ′′ is Z or XZ. As is shown in Fig. 3, the unit cell can be tiled to create the universal
two-dimensional graph state which resembles the brickwork state [3].
time
FIG. 1: (Color online.) The unit cell for Protocol 2.
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FIG. 2: (Color online.) Operations which can be implemented in the unit cell. Red triangles are Pauli byproducts. In (c), the
blue T can be replaced with T †.
BLINDNESS OF PROTOCOL 2
Theorem 3: Protocol 2 satisfies (B1).
Proof: Let B be the random variable which represents the type of the POVM which Bob performs on his system,
and MB be the random variable which represents the result of the POVM. Let T be the random variable which
8=
U
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time
FIG. 3: (Color online.) Tiling for Protocol 2.
represents Alice’s message to Bob about the channel loss. Let A be the random variable which represents Alice’s
measurement angles. Bob’s knowledge about Alice’s measurement angles is given by the conditional probability
distribution of A = a given B = b, MB = mB and T = t:
P (A = a | B = b,MB = mB, T = t).
From Bayes’ theorem, we have
P (A = a | B = b,MB = mB, T = t) = P (MB = mB, A = a,B = b, T = t)
P (B = b,MB = mB, T = t)
=
P (MB = mB, A = a,B = b)P (T = t)
P (B = b,MB = mB, T = t)
=
P (MB = mB | A = a,B = b)P (A = a,B = b)P (T = t)
P (B = b,MB = mB, T = t)
=
P (MB = mB | A = a′, B = b)P (A = a′, B = b)P (T = t)
P (B = b,MB = mB, T = t)
= P (A = a′ | B = b,MB = mB, T = t).

Theorem 4: Protocol 2 satisfies (B2).
Proof: Let B be the random variable which represents the type of the POVM which Bob performs on his system,
and MB be the random variable which represents the the result of the POVM. Let T be the random variable which
represents Alice’s message to Bob about the channel loss. Let O be the random variable which represents the output
of Alice’s algorithm. Bob’s knowledge about the output of Alice’s algorithm is given by the conditional probability
distribution of O = o given B = b, MB = mB, and T = t:
P (O = o | B = b,MB = mB, T = t).
From Bayes’ theorem, we have
P (O = o | B = b,MB = mB, T = t) = P (MB = mB, O = o,B = b, T = t)
P (B = b,MB = mB, T = t)
=
P (MB = mB, O = o,B = b)P (T = t)
P (B = b,MB = mB, T = t)
=
P (MB = mB | O = o,B = b)P (O = o,B = b)P (T = t)
P (B = b,MB = mB, T = t)
=
P (MB = mB | O = o′, B = b)P (O = o′, B = b)P (T = t)
P (B = b,MB = mB, T = t)
= P (O = o′ | B = b,MB = mB, T = t).

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